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A Preliminary Empirical Test of Daft and Weick's Typology
of Organizations as Interpretive Systems

A preliminary test of the Daft and Weick typology using a controlled
environment has resulted in only limited support for the relationships
between construction of the environment and scanning, interpretation and
decision processes. Additional analysis, however, did indicate a strong
relationship between assumptions about the environment and performance of the
organization.
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Only recently have scholars begun to identify the critical role that the
process of interpretation plays within organizations.

Interpretation has been

hypothesized as determining the ways in which organizations will function
internally (Daft & Weick, 1984) as well as its overall effectiveness and
flexibility in adapting to changes in its external environment (e.g. Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978, Meyer, 1982; Dess & Keats, 1984).

Most recently, Daft and

Weick (1984) have proposed that numerous internal organizational
characteristics and, ultimately performance, are premised on the ways in which
key decision makers interpret their environments.
To date, however, little empirical research has been done to assess
organizations as interpretive systems or to understand the actual impact that
different processes of interpretation have, although a number of scholars have
called for such research (e.g. Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Pondy & Mitroff,
1979; Ford & Baucus, 1987). Recognizing that the paucity of study in the area
might be related to the difficulty of researching interpretive processes and
their relationships to other organizational factors, Daft and Weick (1984)
proposed a tentative model of organizations as interpretive systems for future
empirical testing. This paper reports a preliminary test of selected aspects
of the Daft and Weick (1984) framework under a controlled environmental
situation.

A controlled environment was considered important to this

preliminary investigation so that differences in outcomes could be attributed
more directly to differences in ways of enacting the environment, rather than
to all of the other extraneous factors that might otherwise modify the
predicted relationships.
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THE DAFT AND WEICK TYPOLOGY

In recent articles there has been increasing attention to the notion that
the environments in which organizations exist are enacted by organizational
participants (Weick, 1979; Smircich and Stubbart, 1985) . Prior research
(Aguilar, 1967; Wilensky, 1967) has suggested that certain fundamental
assumptions about how an organization constructs its environment emerge.

On

the one hand, an organization enacts its environment as either analyzable or
unanalyzable .

Environments that are considered analyzable are those which are

assumed to be easily understood, containing information that is concrete,
hard, measurable and determinant. That is, organizations believe these
environments contain predictable relationships that can be discovered,
understood and employed.

Environments that are unanalyzable are assumed to be

confusing, chaotic and jumbled, with very little predictability in terms of
events that will occur or their relationship to one another.
On the other hand, organizations can have either an active or passive
orientation relative to trying to make sense of that environment.

Thus,

organizations with an active orientation engage in very proactive and
energetic searches for information that will generate data about the
environment. This orientation encourages organizations to go beyond the limits
of existing information and constantly attempt to generate more. Organizations
with a passive orientation are relatively inactive in trying to gather data
that would help them comprehend their surroundings. These organizations prefer
merely accepting whatever information is provided.
According to Daft and Weick (1984), these fundamental assumptions about
the environment concerning analyzability and action orientation create four
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distinct cognitive frames of reference that govern how information is
gathered, interpreted and manipulated, decisions made and strategies
formulated. (For a complete d.iscussion of these relationships, consult Daft
and Weick, 1984)).
Analyzable/Active
When the environment is analyzable and the organization is active in its
attempts to understand that environment, organizations very proactively and
systematically gather data about what is happening in the environment.
Because the environment is considered analyzable, data are gathered actively
within the organization (internally) but through impersonal channels, such as
financial documents, or formal reports, studies, and searches (c.£. Aguilar,
1967; Wilensky, 1967). In processing this information, the organization,
requires little discussion time since the data have already been reduced into
summary documents or reports. Decisions are made primarily through detailed
quantitative analysis and logic, with personnel carefully weighing decision
alternatives. The strategy most often pursued will be that of analyzer, which
Miles & Snow (1978) describe as a strategy in which the organization maintains
a stable core of activities with movement into innovative areas only after
careful and thorough consideration.
Analyzable/Passive
When the environment is believed analyzable, but the organization is
passive in its action orientation, the organization will also rely on internal
and impersonal data sources, but make no attempt to gather new data or
systematically analyze actual data received.

The organization will be

satisfied with the routine and traditional mechanisms, such as formalized
records or established information systems, available to assemble that
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information. In other words, the organization will not attempt to reduce the
amount of information it has, and will use fewer discussion cycles to reach
decisional agreement. In decision making, managers are programmed to respond
in prescribed ways based on past experiences using standard and routine
guidelines . And, in strategy formulation, the organization will attempt to
maintain traditional markets, protecting the areas in which it already knows
how to compete successfully. This is consistent with the defender strategy of
Miles and Snow (1978).
Unanalyzable/Passive
When the environment is considered unanalyzable, however, and the action
orientation is passive, the organization will rely on nonroutine and informal
information, rumors, hunches and speculation about what is happening. Rather
than impersonal and internal sources, data will be gathered from external and
personal sources, such as outside experts, or members of other organizations.
Because the environment is not believed understandable, there will be multiple
interpretations offered and extensive discussions will be required to arrive
at a common interpretation.

Decisions, therefore, will be arrived at through

coalition building . Because the organization will be preoccupied with
formulating its internal understanding, and not necessarily predisposed to act
proactively, the strategy followed will be one of reactor.

As described by

Miles and Snow (1978), this strategy focuses on merely reacting to
environmental pressures and making changes, not necessarily as a result of
what's best for the organization, but of what the organization believes it is
being pressured into.
Unanalyzable/Active
When the environment is constructed as unanalyzable, and the organization
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is active in its attempts to understand, there will be experimenting and
testing as a way to actively cope with the environmental uncertainty. The
sources of data are external, yet personal, acquired primarily from irregular
reports and intermittent feedback from actions taken . In interpreting
information, the organization will require some basic rules and a moderate
amount of discussion . There will be a moderate level of equivocality
reduction.

In decision making, the lack of precedence will encourage

considerable discussion of "what-ifs," and relatively active experimentation
to gain information about the environment and how it works. Daft and Weick
(1984) contend that this is consistent with the strategy of prospector which
Miles and Snow (1978) characterize as being highly innovative and risk-taking
in the pursuit of entrepreneurial, "try it and see," market opportunities.

HYPOTHESES
Figure 1 summarizes the relationships proposed by the Daft and Weick
model (1984) .

In general, Daft and Weick (1984) suggest that the sources of

information and data acquisition, equivocality reduction and discussion
cycles, decision processes, and strategic type will differ significantly
depending on how the environment is constructed and depending on the
organization's action orientation relative to that environment. Specifically,
this research tested the following relationships suggested by the Daft and
Weick (1984):

insert Figure 1 about here
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Hypothesis 1:

If the environment is viewed as unanalyzable, the organization
will use significantly more external and personal sources of
information and less internal and impersonal sources of
information.

Hypothesis 2:

If the environment is viewed as analyzable, the organization
will use significantly more internal and impersonal sources of
information and less personal and external sources of
information.

Hypothesis 3:

If the environment is viewed as active, the unanalyzable
organization will use the same number of decision cycles as
the analyzable organization. If the environment is viewed as
passive, the unanalyzable organization will use significantly
more decision cycles than the analyzable organization and
the active organizations.

Hypothesis 4:

If the environment is analyzable, the passive and active
organization will both report low equivocality reduction. This
amount of equivocality reduction will be different from the
unanalyzable organizations.

Hypothesis 5:

The unanalyzable/passive organization will report higher
equivocality reduction than any of the other types.

Hypothesis 6:

Coalition building will be reported as the predominate
decision making process in the unanalyzable/passive
organization, speculation and what-ifs in the unanalyzable
active organization, application of routine guidelines in the
analyzable/passive organization and quantitative analysis in
the analyzable/activ~ organization.

METHODS
To test these hypotheses, questionnaire data were collected from 64
"banks" engaged in a banking simulation game.

Because of the anticipated

difficulty in operationalizing these constructs in actual banks and in
eliminating the effects of extraneous factors, a bank simulation game appeared
to offer the ideal setting in which to establish the existence and direction
of the hypothesized relationships.

According to Cameron and Whetten (1981),

simulations, which are used extensively in financial and economic research,
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are an underutilized, yet advantageous mechanism in organizational study
(Cohen and Cyert, 1965).

Simulations are especially appropriate in cases such

as this model when there is either little empirical knowledge about the
processes or outcomes to be examined or they are inherently ambiguous or
complex (lnbar & Stoll, 1972).
The Banking Simulation
The simulation game employed, BankExec, was designed in collaboration
with bankers to be played by bankers in simulating asset and liability
management in an uncertain and evolving economy.

Banks are grouped in

communities of eight with each bank competing directly against the seven other
banks in its community, as well as within the broader national economy.

All

banks started identically, that is, each team took over operations of the same
bank about which they received two years worth of financial history. Each team
functioned as the top management of that bank and were responsible for making
strategic decisions at four different times (quarters in 1994) in which they
were to determine product/market focus, interest rates and fee schedules on
products (e.g. consumer loans, residential loans, commercial checking), and
investment opportunities for generating, investing, or reallocating funds.
Prior to each set of decisions, each bank received an economic forecast of
anticipated national interest rates for the upcoming quarter, and detailed
data about the financial position of their bank and the seven others in their
community resulting from the previous quarter's decisions.
Sample
In this simulation 64 banks were created, each composed of 4-7 bankers
attending the American Bankers Association Stonier Graduate School of Banking
first year program. These 64 banks were subdivided into eight communities .
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A total of 355 participants, all bank or banking related officers or managers,
were assigned by the school's coordinators to one of those banks. The goal was
to distribute experiences, banking tenure and education equally across groups.
Questionnaire Construction and Data Collection
Three different questionnaires were distributed during the game and
filled out by each participant. A pre-questionnaire before the groups were
formed into teams gathered demographic information about each individual,
specifically sex, age, education level, banking experience, years in banking
and size of employing institution. After the third decision period, a
questionnaire was completed with items measuring sources of information used
and their relative contribution to decisions, as well as qualitative
information about the bank's strategic intentions and rationale. After the
fourth and final decision, a questionnaire was completed with items measuring
individual team members' beliefs about the environment, their banks'
orientation to that environment, number of decision cycles, decision processes
and information processing methods. Since questionnaires were included as part
of the simulation experience, the return rate on questionnaires was
consistently 90-98% per decision.
Independent Variable
A first step in the research was to construct the Daft and Weick (1984)
framework based on measures of analyzability of the environment and action
orientation relative to that environment and classify banks into appropriate
cells.

Questions asked participants to rank order on a seven point scale how

easily understandable or confusing they believed the environment to be and how
active or passive their bank appeared. Dichotomous variables were created by
dividing each variable measure into two groups depending on whether the
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groups' mean responses were above or below the total sample mean. Together,
this classification scheme created the four cells of Daft and Weick (1984):
unanalyzable/passive, unanalyzable/active, analyzable/passive,
analyzable/active. The 63 classified banks were divided 14, 14, 15, and 20,
respectively. (One bank did not return the final questionnaire).
Dependent Variables and Analysis
Sources of information were measured by asking participants to rank order
the contribution of selected sources of information to the decisions being
constructed. On a Likert scale (7•most important; l•least important),
participants rated the contribution of effective group decision making, group
consensus, instructor guidance, influential individuals, the activities of
other banks, forecast of economic trends, the financial portfolio, results of
previous decisions, performance of other banks, speculation about the
competition, discussion inside the group and discussions outside with other
team members. Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation of
these items generated four factors, identified as personal/internal, personal/
external, impersonal/internal and impersonal/external (see Table 1).

insert table 1 about here

Items loading on each factor were summed and divided by the number of items as
a measure of that factor.

Then, similar to procedures used by Daft, Sormunen

and Parks (1988), new variables were created for personal, impersonal,
internal and external sources of data as follows:
1.

Personal • (Personal/Interna l + Pe rsonal/Exte rnal)/2

2.

Impersonal

=

(Impersonal/Internal + Impersonal/External)/2
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3.

Internal

4.

External • (Personal/External

c

(Personal/Internal + Impersonal/Internal}/2
+

Impersonal/External}/2

The number of decision cycles used was measured by asking individuals to
rank order whether their group used few or many discussion cycles (1•many;
7•one to two} before agreement was reached. The question was reverse scored
and the mean response for each bank was calculated.
Equivocality reduction was measured by asking participants to assess on a
1-7 scale (7•high; 1clow) the importance of four methods of coping with the
information available or constructed during the simulation. Trying to build a
coalition through extensive discussion and discussing 'what-ifs' possibilities
were used to operationalize high equivocality reduction, while employing
routine banking guidelines and relying on quantitative analysis of existing
financial information were considered to represent low equivocality reduction .
Total scores for high and low equivocality reduction were constructed by
summing and weighting the items composing each variable.
Table 2 presents means and standard deviations for dependent variables.
A general linear model was used to determine initially if there were
significant overall differences. Planned contrasts were conducted as part of
that analysis to assess the predictions about mean differences among different
classification types and sources of information, decision cycles and
equivocality reduction. The specific contrasts examined are incorporated into
Table 3 (see Results section).

Insert table 2 about here

Decision processes were measured by asking participants to select the
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most representative decision process used in their banks from four choices:
trying to create a consensus, applying routine banking guidelines, discussions
of contingencies, and extensive quantitative analysis. Individual responses
were examined by bank and a group plurality was determined and entered as the
group's decision process. Frequencies and percentages of matches between
decision process and classification type were recorded.
Additional analyses:

Analysis of variance to assess performance

differences between banks, depending on how they constructed their environment
and responded to it, was used.

Total return to shareholders, return on assets

and net income were the dependent measures in these analyses.

RESULTS
Results of the general linear model indicated overall significant
differences for impersonal and internal sources of information (F•2.37; p<.10
and F•3.10, p<.OS, respectively), for number of decision cycles (F•3.44,
p<.OS), and for both high and low equivocality reduction (F•2.57, p<.10 and
F•2.56, p<.10, respectively) . There were no overall significant differences
for external or personal sources of information.

Insert table 3 about here

Results of the planned contrasts for sources of information, equivocality
reduction and decision cycles are presented in Table 3.

While both

unanalyzable groups did use personal sources of information, contrary to
predictions (Hypothesis 1), all the groups used the same amount of personal
information. While the unanalyzable groups did not differ in the use of

14
external data, the predicted differences (Hypothesis 1) between these groups
and the analyzable group were also not supported. For impersonal sources of
information, the analyzable groups used significantly more impersonal data, as
predicted (Hypothesis 2), than the unanalyzable/passive group (F•4.74, p<.OS);
but, the predicted differences between the analyzable groups and the
unanalyzable/active group were not supported. In addition, contrary to
predictions, the unanalyzable/passive group used significantly more, not an
equal amount, of impersonal data than the unanalyzable/active banks (Fc6.24,
p<.OS).

For internal sources of information, the analyzable groups used

significantly more internal data than the unanalyzable/passive group (Fc7.02,
p<.OS), as predicted (Hypothesis 2). Contrary to predictions, the banks that
considered the environment unanalyzable and were passive used significantly
more internal sources of data than banks who were unanalyzable/passive
(F•6.84, p(.OS). Predicted differences between the analyzable group and the
unanalyzable/active group were not supported.
The planned contrasts results generally did support the hypothesis for
number of decision cycles. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, the analyzable/active
and unanalyzable/active groups reported the same number of decision cycles;
the unanalyzable/passive group reported significantly more decision cycles
than the active groups (F•7.37, p(.Ol) and significantly more than the
analyzable/passive banks (F•3.68. p(.10).
The results for low equivocality reduction indicated significant
differences, though in the opposite direction from predicted (Hypothesis 4).
Although both sets of banks that viewed the environment as analyzable reported
no differences in the amount of equivocality reduction, these same banks
showed a significantly greater use of financial analysis and application of
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traditional banking standards than either set of unanalyzable banks (F•5.95,
p(.05).
The results for high equivocality reduction were generally opposite from
predictions (Hypothesis 5).

In general, both sets of analyzable banks

reported significantly more, not less, use of coalition building and trial and
error (F•4.20, p(.05). In particular, the banks that were unanalyzable/passive
used significantly less, not more, coalitions and trial and error than either
set of analyzable banks (F•5.78, p<.05).
The results examining the relationship between classification type and
decision processes (Hypothesis 6) were tenuous. The higher proportion of
agreement tended to occur in the unanalyzable/passive and analyzable/active
banks. Table 5 indicates that within the analyzable/active group 35% made
decisions based on quantitative analysis. Within the unanalyzable/passive
group, 36% made decision by building a group consensus. Within the
unanalyzable/active group, none made decisions by discussing what-if
possibilities. Finally, within the analyzable/passive group, only 14% made
decisions by employing standard banking criteria.

insert table 5 about here

Results of the analysis of variance for performance measures also
provided intriguing results in the study. They indicated that banks performed
significantly differently depending on their beliefs about the analyzability
of the environment and their action orientation.

Significant performance

differences were observed for all financial measures: year-to-date ROA (F
14.31, p <.0001), total return to shareholders (F • 5.15, p

< .01),

c

and, net
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income (F • 3.27, p

<

.OS) (see Table 6). Post-hoc tests of the means

(Scheffe) indicated that the analyzable/active group significantly outperformed all the other groups on ROA and total return to shareholders, and
that the unanalyzable/passive group performed significantly worse than either
of the analyzable groups.

DISCUSSION

This research set out to test the assertions of Daft and Weick (1984)
that specific assumptions about the environment and particular action
orientations would result in different scanning processes, interpretation
processes and decision processes. Overall, the predicted relationships in the
model were only partially supported. Components of the model for internal and
impersonal sources of information, and decision cycles were supported, while
differences in both high and low equivocality reduction were opposite from
predictions. No significant support was found for personal and external
sources of information. Observed matches between environmental construction
and decision processes were also minimal, although there appeared to be more
matches in banks when the environment was constructed as unanalyzable/passive
or analyzable/active.
In terms of actual performance, those banks viewing the environment as
analyzable and taking an active stance performed better on measures of ROA and
total return to shareholders. Interestingly, these same banks
(analyzable/active) also appeared not to limit themselves to only internal and
impersonal sources of data. In fact, these banks used more total sources of
information, some sources significantly more so, than other groups,
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particularly when compared to those banks viewing the environment as
unanalyzable and acting passively with respect to it. This observation appears
consistent with Daft et. al. (1988) who found that high performing companies
scanned more data sources more frequently than lower performing ones.

Along

with more data sources, fewer decision cycles were necessary for the
active/analyzable group, perhaps because they generally had more information
at their disposal as a result of using more data sources. The use of multiple
sources of data may arise from increased feelings of control over the
environment and a consequent lessened need for discussion because so much
information has been shared among the group.
The analyzable/active banks also showed a significant difference in the
use of quantitative analysis and standard banking procedures, even more so
than banks that also viewed the environment as analyzable, yet acted passively
with respect to it. Curiously, however, both active and passive analyzable
banks also reported higher, not lower, use of coalition building and trial and
error.

It may be that an active stance relative to the environment encourages

various methods of information processing strategies, perhaps, dependent upon
the information being reduced.
There are several interpretations of the lack of congruence between
decision processes and the classifications as proposed by Daft and Weick
(1984). The first and most obvious is that the simulation game was not longlived enough for groups to fully develop a consistent set of decision
processes. However, while only four decisions were made, they do represent one
full year of intense bank operations, during which success is contingent upon
developing and implementing a consistent set of asset and liability management
decisions. Another possibility is that measures were inadequately or
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incompletely operationalized. It is entirely conceivable that the teams were
unaware of the decision processes they used or were unable to identify the
processes clearly enough in order to translate them into categories provided.
The results for decision processes should, therefore, be considered with
caution.
The specific relationships found do suggest that elements of the Daft and
Weick (1984) typology offer insights into differences in internal
organizational operations. However, in further explaining the limited support
for the Daft and Weick (1984) typology, it is possible that the relationships
formulated by Daft and Weick (1984) are simply not as clear-cut as those
authors describe. In fact, the general patterns of means, from lowest in the
unanalyzable/passive group to highest in the analyzable/active banks, suggests
that model may be less cross-sectional and more a process of development along
two separate continuum: one reflecting the analyzability of the environment
and the other capturing the organization's action orientation. A continua of
environmental construction might account for the observed pattern of means at
the high and low ends and the difficulty of capturing differences in the
sources of information tapped, the number of decision cycles or amount of
equivocality reduction of those banks not at those extremes.
Perhaps the most interesting and managerially significant finding of this
study relates to the performance differences.

When the environment is

believed to be understandable and the organization takes an active not passive
stance, it is likely to perform better on both internal and external
performance measures than companies with different environmental
constructions.

Further research, such as that by Daft et. al. suggesting that

scanning processes differ in high versus low performance companies, would be
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needed to explore how performance is related to or affected by scanning,
interpretive or decisional processes.
For the interim, ·from these limited results, it can be suggested that
there is a relationship between performance outcomes and positive assessments
about the analyzability of the environment together with an active stance with
regard to that environment.

These factors also appear to be positively

related to the use of numerous and varied information sources, which, if the
expected causal relationship holds true, results in increased organizational
efficiency with regard to decision making since fewer decision cycles are
needed.
In summary, the significant differences found do indicate that the model
has tapped into some important factors that may ultimately help explain
performance differences as well as differences in internal organizational
processes in companies operating in similar environments. Further research is
needed to improve understand of the directionality of the relationships or
suggest alternative explanations.

It does appear, however, that beliefs of

greater analyzability and activeness with regard to the environment have some
relationship to better performance and that multiple sources of data may be
one moderating factor in explaining those performance differences.
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Figure 1
Summary of Daft and Weick (1984)
Unanalyzable/
Passive

Unanalyzable/
Active

Analyzable/
Passive

Information
Sources

external,
personal

external,
personal

internal,
impersonal

internal,
impersonal

Decision
Cycles

many

moderate

few

moderate

Equivocality
Reduction

high

moderate

low

low

Decision
Making

coalition
building

trial
error

standard
guidelines

quant.
analysis

Strategy*

reactor

prospector

defender

analyzer

*

&

Strategic differences were not assessed in this study.

Analyzable/
Active
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Table 1
Data Sources
FACTORS
Impersonal/
External

Impersonal/
Internal

Personal/
Internal

.25058
.39589
.07795
.12809
-.00530
.72052
.73624
.76393
.16493
.00351
.19992
.00286

.50544
.32603
.02375
.67175
.14196
.12183
.12679
.24935
.11631
.07639
.78845
-.01715

Personal/
External

Items:
Effective grp discussion
.00540
Influential individuals*
.18491
Activities of other bks
.83867
Group consensus
.14904
Instructor guidance
.05064
Forecast of economy
-.10158
Past portfolio of decisions .20902
Previous decisions
.16317
Past performance
.84510
Speculation about other bks .81195
In session discussion
.09485
Discussion with other bks
.13322
*Item dropped due to pattern of loadings.

-.11949
.40559
.01849
.14019
.75929
-.02745
.05636
.00035
.08262
.18676
.03166
.76314
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations
Unanalyzable/
Passive
(n•14)

Analyzable/
Passive
(n•l4)

Unanalyzable/
Active
(n•l5)

Analyzable/
Active
(n•20)

Variable

Mean

Mean

Mean

Mean

Personal

4.67

.336

4. 78

.388

4. 70

.344

4.85

.307

Impersonal

5.07

.322

5.26

.334

5.36

.445

5.29

. 271

External

4.13

.438

4 . 11

.488

4.12

.513

4.17

.416

Internal

5.39

.394

5 . 66

.207

5.73

.318

5.29

.271

Decision
Cycles

3.97

.772

3.38

.737

3.48

.868

3.07

.832

Hi Equiv.

4.69

.481

5.02

.413

4.98

.611

5.18

.497

Lo Equiv.

4.52

.753

4.82

.390

4.59

.491

5.02

.664

S.D.

S.D.

S.D.

S.D.
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Table 3
VARIABLE
Personal

Impersonal

External

Internal

Decision
Cycles

PLANNED CONTRASTS
Unanalyzab le/ • Unanalyzab le/
Passive
Active
Analyzable/
• Analyzable/
Passive
Active
Unanalyzabl e > Analyzable
Unanalyzab le/ • Unanalyzab le/
Passive
Active
Analyzable/
.. Analyzable/
Passive
Active
Analyzable
> Unanalyzab le/
Passive
Analyzable
Unanalyzab
le/
>
Active
Unanalyzab le/ = Unanalyzab le/
Passive
Active
Analyzable/
.. Analyzable/
Passive
Active
Unanalyzabl e > Analyzable
Unanalyzab le/ • Unanalyzab le/
Passive
Active
Analyzable/
.. Analyzable/
Passive
Active
Analyzable
> Unanalyzab le/
Passive
Analyzable
> Unanalyzab le/
Active
Unanalyzab le/ • Analyzable/
Active
Active
Unanalyzab le/ > Analyzable/
Passive
Passive
Unanalyzab le/ > Active
Passive

F

DIRECTION SUPPORTED

0.04

2.22

-..

6.24**

>

0.33

0 . 08
4.74**

>

0.56

=

0.05
0.03
0.63
6.84**

<

0.41
7.02**

>

0 . 17

-

2.20
3.68*

>

7.37***

>
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Table 3
(cont.)

VARIABLE

PLANNED CONTRASTS

Equivocality
Reduction
Analyzable/
• Analyzable/
(High)
Passive
Active
Unanalyzable/ > Analyzable
Passive
Unanalyzable > Unanalyzable/
Passive
Active
Unanalyzable > Analyzable

Equivocality
Reduction
Analyzable/
.. Analyzable/
(Low)
Passive
Active
Unanalyzable/ > Analyzable
Passive
Unanalyzable/ > Unanalyzable/
Passive
Active
Unanalyzable > Analyzable

***
**
*

p<.Ol
p<.05
p<.lO

F

DIRECTION SUPPORTED

0.87

s. 78"'*

<

2.27

-

4.20**

<

0.95
4. 64**

<

0.13
5.95**

<
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Table 4
Percentages and Matches
Environmental Construction and Decision Process

Unanalyzable/
Passive

Analyzable/
Passive
Std Banking
Guidelines

Unanalyzable/
Active
Trial
Error

Analyzable/
Active
Quantitative
Analysis

Decision Process
Predicted

Coalition
Building

Number Observed

6

2

0

7

43%

14%

0%

35%

Percent of total
in category

&
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Table S
Performance Differences by Classification Type
Variable

F

ROA

14.31**"'

RTSfl

S.1S**

NET INCOME

3.27*

Unanalyze/
Passive

Analyze/
Passive

Unanalyze/
Active

Analyze/
Active

.19

.62

.41

.86

-.03

.12

.OS

.27

.96

1. so

1.02

1.66

# Total return to shareholders (% increase in stock price plus dividends)

***
**
*

p
p

p

<
<
<

.0001
.01
.OS
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